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Abstract 
The present paper examines the role of cooperative relations among incumbents in the formation 
of new firms. We argue that cooperative interfirm relations that bridge geographically remote and 
diverse sources of knowledge, i.e., cross-cutting ties, contribute to new firm formation. 
Employing data on state-level entries in the US biotech industry from 1994 to 1998, we find 
support to the following hypotheses: the formation of new firms in a focal region of an industry is 
positively related to the number of cross-cutting ties; the number of cross-cutting ties negatively 
moderates the effects of organizational density on the formation of new firms.  
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INTRODUCTION 
As White (2002: 286) observes, producers use their peers as benchmarks for adjusting their 
decisions. This view of competition is reflected well in the embeddedness hypothesis 
(Granovetter, 1985), which states that economic and social behaviors are facilitated and 
constrained by the set of social relations in which each market participant is embedded. A natural 
corollary of this hypothesis is that the pattern of interfirm relations surrounding organizations 
affects their economic exchanges and, more broadly, processes of competition (e.g., Baker, 1990; 
Burt, 1992; Gulati et al., 2000; Uzzi, 1997). 
A widely accepted view in this regard is that cooperative interfirm relations positively 
affect firm performance by pooling resources and mitigating competition. Incumbents that do not 
participate in cooperative relations may be at a disadvantage compared with those embedded in 
them. Research on strategic alliances has repeatedly vindicated this view (Ahuja, 2000; Lavie, 
2007; Powell et al., 1996; Rowley et al., 2000; Shipilov & Li, 2008). Hence, one important 
implication of the embeddedness hypothesis is that the firms embedded in cooperative relations 
outperform the third parties placed outside such relations. 
While the embeddedness hypothesis is readily applied to incumbents in a given market, it 
remains unclear, however, whether or not the cooperation among incumbents poses a competitive 
threat to potential entrants, i.e., to the formation of new firms by nascent entrepreneurs. Of course, 
newly founded firms may perform better when they cooperate with incumbents because they are 
granted access to new resources (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 
1999). Yet, despite a few notable exceptions (i.e., Calabrese, Baum, & Silverman, 2000; Kogut, 
Walter, & Kim, 1995), not much is known about the effects of cooperation among incumbents on 
the potential entrants with no connections to incumbents.  
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Indeed, through interfirm cooperation, incumbents may pre-empt the resources otherwise 
available to nascent entrepreneurs, ultimately inhibiting their entry. In this study, however, we 
investigate one of the mechanisms through which cooperation among incumbents may be 
conducive to new firm formation. In particular, we contend that when cooperation among 
incumbents contributes to knowledge diversity, it will stimulate entrepreneurial activities and 
thus the formation of new firms. Our theoretical argument revolves around the notion of cross-
cutting ties. Building on Simmel (1955) and Blau and Schwartz (1984), we define cross-cutting 
ties as those relations that provide access to geographically remote contacts beyond the focal 
firm’s social boundary.  
The structure of our argument is as follows. First, cooperative interfirm relations, such as 
R&D alliances, are a key conduit of knowledge creation (Hagedoorn, 1993, 2002; Rothaermel & 
Deeds, 2004). Second, spillovers undermine pre-emption; that is, the creation of new knowledge 
facilitates the formation of new firms as long as it spills over to nascent entrepreneurs (Acs et al., 
2009; Audretsch & Stephan, 1999). Third, cross-cutting ties contribute to the transfer of new 
knowledge across regions, which in turn promotes new firm formation. Building on these 
considerations, we propose that in a given region of an industry, the number of cross-cutting ties 
positively affects the number of new firms founded and negatively moderates the effects of 
organizational density on the number of new firms. We test our hypotheses using the data on the 
state-level entries in the US biotech industry from 1994 to 1998. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Scholars from economics and organization theory have long explored how competition underlies 
the evolution of an industry, i.e., the entry of new firms and the growth of incumbents. In contrast, 
the embeddedness hypothesis stresses that cooperative interfirm relations guide economic 
 5 
exchanges and shape competitive outcomes (Baker, 1990; Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997). 
Mounting empirical evidence demonstrates the role of interfirm relations in determining firm 
performance (e.g., Baum et al., 2000; Shane & Cable, 2002; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). 
 The embeddedness hypothesis implicitly assumes that cooperative interfirm relations may 
pose a competitive threat to the firms not involved in such relations, particularly to nascent 
entrepreneurs. If incumbents appropriated all the resources on the market by cooperating with 
their rivals, new business opportunities would be depleted, and new firm formation inhibited. Yet, 
two empirical papers point to the opposite direction. Calabrese, Baum and Silverman (2000) 
argued that incumbents forming vertical alliances cannot entirely preempt the newly created 
knowledge because either spillovers or mimetic behaviors enable nascent entrepreneurs to benefit 
from the knowledge. Similarly, Kogut, Walter, and Kim (1995) observed that active cooperation 
among incumbents may signal the presence of emerging commercial or technological 
opportunities, which attract the attention of nascent entrepreneurs.  
The crux of the debate lies in theorizing about the effects of two parties’ cooperation on a 
third party not directly involved. We do not deny that the two parties involved in the cooperation 
seek to maximize the benefits stemming from it. Rather, we argue that the benefits of such 
cooperation may spill over to nearby entrepreneurs. As Owen-Smith and Powell (2004: 7) argued, 
interfirm relations are “leaky” pipelines that “function more like sprinklers, irrigating the broader 
community.” Given the possible, unintended consequences of two parties’ cooperation, 
theorizing about the effects of cooperation at the dyad level is rather myopic. In the present study, 
therefore, we address this issue by viewing cross-cutting ties as institutional channels for 
knowledge spillovers. Our arguments rely upon both geographical knowledge spillovers and the 
role of cross-cutting ties in triggering them.  
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Notice that we distinguish between resources and knowledge. Unlike resources, 
knowledge cannot be fully preempted – a phenomenon commonly understood as knowledge 
spillovers. Knowledge spillovers refer to positive externalities that third parties, not directly 
involved in the creation of the new knowledge, may benefit without paying its inventor (Arrow, 
1962; Mansfield, 1985). Several empirical studies have suggested that knowledge spillovers 
stimulate entrepreneurial activities and lead to firm-level productivity increases in an industry or 
in a region (e.g., Audretsch, 1995; Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; Ceccagnoli, 2005).  
The following two instances illustrate how spillovers may occur. First, the third party may 
discover new applications of the knowledge created by the inventor. Many entrepreneurs in the 
biotech industry were employees of large pharmaceutical firms and decided to start up their own 
business because they discovered business opportunities unexploited by their employers (e.g., 
Feldman, 2001; Kenney & Von Berg, 1999). Second, the third party may come to know what the 
inventor knows by recruiting staffs having previously worked for the inventor or by engaging in 
face-to-face interactions with the inventor. As Arrow (1962) argued, knowledge is non-
excludable: once disclosed it is hard to exclude others from using it. 
Notwithstanding a variety of channels for knowledge spillovers, such as cooperation with 
universities, formal alliance agreements, and labor mobility (Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Feldman, 
2001; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004; Stuart & Sorenson, 2003; Zucker et al., 1998), the common 
denominator to this literature is that the likelihood of knowledge spillovers increases with the 
number of actors involved in knowledge creation (e.g., Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Audretsch & 
Stephan, 1996; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004). Compared with a single person’s invention, 
knowledge creation by multiple parties results in more social contacts through which such 
knowledge may spill over to third parties. An interfirm relation (e.g., an alliance agreement) is a 
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primary example of this kind.   
Among the various types of interfirm relations, we focus here on formal R&D cooperative 
agreements that involve firms from the same industry, yet located in different regions. As we will 
discuss below, such cooperation is likely to transfer new knowledge into the focal region. We 
refer to this type of cooperation as cross-cutting ties.  
Scholars in sociology have long elaborated on the notion of cross-cutting ties. This 
concept, originally derived from Simmel’s study on conflict (1955: 150-154) and further 
extended by Blau and Schwartz (1984), refers to the linkages that span across social categories or 
bounded groups. Cross-cutting ties help to connect different groups and provide them access to 
new information. In this regard, cross-cutting ties are out-category ties, as opposed to in-category 
ties (Wellman, 1988; McPherson Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001).  
Cross-cutting ties are different from bridging ties that link otherwise isolated contacts 
(Burt, 1992). Unlike bridging ties that are defined on relational distance between contacts, cross-
cutting ties are based on social distance between groups. These two notions however may 
converge when social distance comes to be similar to relational distance. One possible condition 
of this kind is the principle of homophily (McPherson et al., 2001), which states that actors 
proximate in the social space, such as same age or gender, are likely to connect to each other.  
In parallel with Sorenson and Baum (2003), we embed our definition of cross-cutting ties 
into geography. In this study, cross-cutting ties are conceived of as relationships that link 
geographically dispersed groups, whose face-to-face interactions are infrequent. In particular, 
cross-cutting ties concern the social distance between groups with clear social boundaries, rather 
than the sheer physical distance between them. Accordingly, our approach echoes the definition 
of global structural hole developed by Reagans and McEvily (2001) and that of network range by 
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Reagans and McEvily (2003), both of which refer to ties that cut across institutional or social 
boundaries. Cross-cutting ties thus can be understood as ties that go “beyond a given social 
boundary” and connect separate knowledge sources.  
Cross-Cutting Ties and Industry Evolution 
The creation of new knowledge may stimulate business opportunities, which are essential for the 
evolution of an industry (Acs et al., 2009; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004; Rothaermel & Deeds, 
2004). As for the creation of new knowledge, the existing literature stresses the role of 
cooperative interfirm relations (Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004; Lavie, 
2006). Obviously, the direct beneficiaries of cooperative interfirm relations are the incumbents 
that are embedded in those relations. Abundant empirical evidence supports this claim at the 
organizational level (e.g., Brass et al., 2004). Yet, the possible unintended consequences of 
cooperative interfirm relations for unspecified third parties call for an analysis beyond the 
organizational level. Drawing upon the literature of knowledge spillovers (Acs, Audretsch, & 
Feldman, 1992; Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; Audretsch & Lehman 2005; Feldman, 1994; Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993), we argue that the new knowledge created by cross-cutting ties 
may benefit the nascent entrepreneurs co-located in the same region.  
The literature suggests that knowledge spillovers are geographically localized. This means 
that the firms located in the vicinity of an inventor may benefit without paying the costs of 
knowledge creation: what the innovator knows is likely to spill over to third parties co-located in 
the same region (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; Jaffe et al., 1993). As Cooper and Folta (2000) 
have argued, knowledge spillovers may be more beneficial to emerging firms than to established 
ones. Therefore, to the extent that cross-cutting ties contribute to the transfer of new and diverse 
knowledge in a region, more entrepreneurial activities should emerge therein (see also Acs et al., 
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2009). In particular, the following implications for new entrants are derived. 
First, cross-cutting ties transfer new knowledge into a given region and thus increase the 
diversity of knowledge therein. Cross-cutting ties connect firms that operate in different 
geographical regions of an industry. Our assumption here is that the firms located in the same 
region are more likely to share similar knowledge than those that operate in different regions. 
That is because knowledge spillovers are localized in the vicinity of the knowledge created 
(Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; Jaffe et al., 1993; Singh, 2005). When firms develop cooperative 
relationships with partners located outside their region, they may access sources of unfamiliar 
knowledge, transferring this novel knowledge back into the region (e.g., Arikan, 2009). Indeed, 
Zaheer and George (2004) showed that in the biotech industry, alliances with partners located 
outside a firm’s geographical locale guaranteed access to novel and diverse knowledge. Hence, 
the more cross-cutting ties in a given region of the industry, the more diverse knowledge is 
available within that region. 
Second, the increase in knowledge diversity yields new business opportunities for nascent 
entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurship literature (e.g., Shane, 2001; Thornton, 1999) suggests that 
new business opportunities increase as the technical and commercial knowledge accessible to 
nascent entrepreneurs becomes more abundant. Entrepreneurship is often conceived of as a 
process of tapping into the opportunities generated by knowledge spillovers (Acs et al., 2009; 
Audretsch, 1995; Audretsch & Lehmann, 2005). By channelling new knowledge into the region, 
cross-cutting ties serve to create new business opportunities not fully pre-empted by incumbents. 
For example, knowledge diversity leads to product variety as it enhances the room for 
discovering new ways of production (Fleming, 2001; Fleming & Sorenson, 2001), and has been 
found to attract new entrants and to foster innovation in a region (Jacobs, 1969; Glaeser et al., 
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1992). Hence, the diversity of knowledge created by cross-cutting ties should facilitate the 
exploitation of new business opportunities by nascent entrepreneurs. 
Hypothesis 1: The number of new firms in a given region of an industry will increase 
with the number of cross-cutting ties in that region. 
Cross-Cutting Ties and Organizational Density 
As cross-cutting ties contribute to the diversity of knowledge in a region, the level of competition 
therein may be affected as well. In particular, the increase in knowledge diversity enabled by 
cross-cutting ties should lower competitive intensity. For example, when knowledge diversity 
frees new business opportunities, specialist firms proliferate and face less competition (for a 
similar logic see Carroll, 1985). In this respect, the effects of cross-cutting ties on new firms may 
have implications for density-dependence as well (Carroll & Hannan, 2000).  
The density dependent process is described as follows. When a limited number of firms 
develop an emerging business, customers and suppliers are not familiar with it and are reluctant 
to engage in economic exchanges with those firms. Nonetheless, increases in organizational 
density – commonly defined as the number of firms (Carroll & Hannan, 2000) – augment the 
social recognition of this business, and attract more entrepreneurs to it. However, further 
increases in organizational density intensify the competition among those firms because they 
compete for the same pool of increasingly scarce resources. As a consequence, the number of 
new firms founded exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with the density of firms in the 
business (Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Carroll & Hannan, 2000).  
The assumption behind the effects of density-dependence is that the firms involved in a 
given business are identical; they adopt comparable structures, business models, and compete in a 
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market of undifferentiated products (Carroll & Hannan, 2000). In what follows, we argue that the 
effects of organizational density are not independent from those of cross-cutting ties because such 
interfirm relations influence the diversity of knowledge in a region and, potentially, that of the 
businesses located therein. In particular, we argue that cross-cutting ties counter-balance the 
effects of density-dependent legitimation and competition. 
First, legitimation is hampered by cross-cutting ties as such relations lead to the 
emergence of different products and firms. As McKendrick and Carroll (2001: 661) put it, “the 
diversity of … those organizations operating in this market work against the institutionalization 
of disk array (firms)”. The existence of multiple types of firms yields confusion in the eyes of 
stakeholders and market participants, tarnishing the legitimation of the business. As McKendrick 
and his colleagues (2003) have shown, the emergence of homogeneous producers is a critical 
precondition for the birth of a new business. Similar findings are also reported by Boone and his 
collaborators (2007). With respect to legitimation, the effects of organizational density are 
negatively moderated by the number of cross-cutting ties in a given region.  
Second, the diversity of knowledge stimulated by cross-cutting ties lowers the 
competitive effects associated with high organizational density. Suppose two different regions, 
one marked by high organizational density and the other by low organizational density. The 
theory of density dependence suggests that the level of competition would be more intense in the 
former case (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). However, our argument suggests that cross-cutting ties 
contribute to reducing the intensity of density-dependent competition even in presence of 
overcrowding, i.e., in the first region. That is because the diversity of knowledge available in a 
region underlies a diversity of market niches and business models, thereby reducing the 
competition for resources. 
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Hypothesis 2: The inverted-U shaped effect of organizational density on the number of 
new firms in a given region of an industry will be negatively moderated by the number of 
cross-cutting ties in that region. 
METHODS 
Biotechnology Industry 
We tested our hypotheses using data on the U.S. biotechnology industry during the period 1994 
to 1998. Cooperative interfirm relations or strategic alliances, such as co-development of drugs or 
their co-promotion, have been considered critical to firm performance in this industry (Baum et 
al., 2000; Hagedoorn, 1993, 2002; Powell et al., 1996). New product development is a risky and 
capital-intensive process that encompasses drug discovery, clinical tests, and large-scale 
manufacturing and distribution. As most of the biotechnology firms are small, specialized (e.g., 
Arora et al., 2001), they have limited resources and technologies and enter into alliances to 
minimize developmental risks and the associated costs. Such alliances offer access to new 
compounds and technologies and reduce the time to market products (Rothaermel & Deeds, 
2004; Shan et al., 1994; Stuart et al., 1999). The number of R&D alliances in this industry 
increased substantially during the time period of this study. Similarly, the growth rate of patents 
granted increased after 1994 and peaked in 1996. Thus, the role of strategic alliances made this 
industry appropriate for an empirical examination of cross-cutting ties. 
Biotechnology refers to “techniques that use organisms or their cellular, subcellular, or 
molecular components to make products or modify plants, animals, and micro-organisms to carry 
desired traits” (Paugh & LaFrance, 1997). So far, little consensus has been achieved regarding the 
boundary of the biotechnology industry. Because the biotechnology industry is defined on the 
basis of technologies rather than final products, its boundary is not easily and clearly 
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distinguishable. Conceptually, it would be relevant to include any product that incorporates 
biotechnology as a part of the industry. Such an approach, however, expands the boundaries of 
the industry almost infinitely and renders empirical research difficult. It is because most 
empirical data are structured based on the SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) or NAICS 
(North American Industry Classification System) codes, which in turn are based on final products 
of each industry, and not technologies underlying those products. To resolve this boundary issue, 
the present study defines the biotech industry with an emphasis on diagnostics and therapeutics, 
which account for more than 90 percent of biotechnology-related revenues (Standard & Poors, 
2000). While our definition is rather conservative, it covers the lion share of biotechnology-
related revenues and, more importantly, makes empirical analysis manageable. 
Dependent Variable: Number of new firms 
The number of new firms was measured by the number of de novo entries in the 
biotechnology industry in a given state. A de novo entry for year T is defined as an active 
business entity that hires at least one employee and that did not exist prior to year T (e.g., Luger 
& Koo, 2005). This definition excludes both a new business entity that is a branch of multi-
establishment firms and one that is created by name or location changes. Data on de novo entries 
were obtained from the Longitudinal Establishment and Enterprise Microdata (LEEM) archive. 
Explanatory Variables 
Cross-cutting ties. We measured the number of cross-cutting ties in a given state as the 
number of R&D agreements between firms located in the focal state and those in other states. For 
year T, this variable includes only cross-cutting ties involving incumbent firms – i.e., firms 
founded at least in year T-1. Information on R&D agreements in this industry was obtained from 
the Recombinant Capital database. In total, 621 cross-cutting ties were observed during the five 
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years of our observation period, 17 of which involved new firms. The remaining 604 cases were 
employed to compute this variable. The number of cross-cutting ties varied from a low of 96 in 
1994 to a high of 168 in 1997.  
Because our study concerns cooperation among incumbent firms, we did not examine 
industry-university linkages and personnel mobility. Moreover, we did not regard as cross-cutting 
ties marketing agreements, such as joint promotion campaigns, which did not involve intensive 
transfer of knowledge between partners. We also excluded R&D agreements that targeted 
markets outside the U.S.: such alliances were unlikely to directly benefit U.S. entrepreneurs. In 
doing so, we limit our attention to the R&D agreements whose primary goal was to access the 
technologies and the R&D capabilities of partner firms. The geographical distribution of R&D 
agreements observed during our study period suggests that the alliances connecting firms 
belonging to different states represent a suitable operationalization of cross-cutting ties, i.e., ties 
that link knowledge sources with distinct boundaries. The reasons of this claim are as follows.  
First, the lack of uniform nation-wide regulations represents an important obstacle to the 
development of the biotech industry. Depending on laws regulating biotech products, firms will 
decide what to develop and how to develop their products. Biotechnology in the United States 
was regulated by at least five U.S. federal agencies: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). None 
of these agencies was in charge of overseeing all the methods and products of biotechnology. 
Instead, the White House Office on Environmental Policy coordinated the efforts of the separate 
agencies. Accordingly, legal and administrative infrastructures varied substantially across biotech 
product segments and the existence of state-specific legislation led firms in different states to 
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vary with respect to the type of R&D investments.
1
  
Second, insofar as an alliance is a vehicle to access knowledge otherwise not available, 
frequent alliances between two sources may indicate that the knowledge of two sources differs. 
The database of Recombinant Capital yielded 621 R&D agreements among firms from different 
U.S. states between 1994 and 1998, but also 138 R&D agreements among firms located in the 
same state. The number of within-state R&D agreements observed was approximately one fourth 
of the between-state R&D agreements. A majority of within-state R&D agreements were 
concentrated in states with a larger number of between-state agreements. We interpret this 
distribution of alliances as suggesting that the quest for new knowledge of biotech firms is better 
fulfilled through between-state rather than within–state cooperative agreements.  
Lastly, the developmental stage of the biotech industry varied significantly across states. 
Owing to its strong science base, the biotech industry customarily flourished in those locations 
where major research universities or institutes were located. In addition, the biotech firms located 
in each state could not develop their R&D strengths in all the sub-segments of the industry. For 
instance, firms in California specialized in medical devices and equipment, but were not as 
competitive in the drug and pharmaceutical sector as their counterparts in North Carolina or 
Pennsylvania (Biotech Industry Organization, 2006). Although an increasing number of states 
invested millions of dollars to support bioscience, there were still significant variations in the 
depth and breadth of knowledge across states (e.g., Feldman, 2003).  
Our analysis of patents and patent classes supports this claim. For each state, we created a 
vector of patent classes in the rank order of the number of patents. We then computed pair-wise 
Spearman’s rank correlations across different states. If the rank correlation is one, it indicates that 
                                                   
1
 Biotech firms in California were exempt from the 6 % state sales tax; those in North Carolina were 
exempt from a tax on the purchase of manufacturing equipments (Lord Sainsbury, 1999, Biotechnology 
Clusters, DTI, UK). 
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the frequency distribution of patent class is identical across different states. Any value distant 
from one suggests that the distributions are not identical, i.e., states differ with respect to 
knowledge. The average Spearman’s correlation for each state varied from -0.355 to 0.663. The 
correlation for California, Massachusetts, and North Carolina were 0.558, 0.615, and 0.469, 
respectively. The distribution of the correlations suggests, in accordance with Feldman (2003), 
that there existed regional specialization in biotech-related knowledge. 
Organizational density. As routinely done in the organizational ecology literature (e.g., 
Carroll & Hannan, 2000), organizational density, a proxy for density-dependent legitimation and 
competition, was measured by the number of firms that operated in a given state. To correct for 
skewness and mitigate correlations with other control variables, we log-transformed this variable 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1989). Information to compute this variable was obtained from LEEM as 
well as the Census Business Patterns, both of which were compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau.
2
 
Hypothesis 2 was tested by including an interaction term between the cross-cutting ties variable 
and the linear and squared measure of organizational density. The coefficients of these 
interactions will indicate whether the effects of cross-cutting ties strengthened or suppressed 
those of density dependent legitimation and competition, i.e., the inverted U-shaped effect of 
organizational density on the number of new entries (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). 
Control Variables 
Our key assumption is that the knowledge created through cross-cutting ties is available to 
nascent entrepreneurs. However, three sets of alternative explanations may be at work. First, the 
effects of cross-cutting ties could be confounded with the structure of interfirm relations, in 
particular, the degree of non-redundant contacts. As widely discussed in the network literature, 
                                                   
2
 Alternatively, one may use Dun and Bradstreet database, yet the nationwide organizational density shows a big 
fluctuation in the 90s, a pattern that is not found in other nation-level statistics. Hence, we opted for the Census 
Bureau data as we considered them more reliable.  
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the structure of interfirm relations affects the nature of the knowledge created, which is ultimately 
available to nascent entrepreneurs. To control for the effects of tie structure, we included Burt’s 
(1992) measure of network constraint. This measure reflects the extent to which a given region is 
connected to other regions that are mutually connected. 
Second, besides cross-cutting ties, other channels of knowledge spillovers may benefit 
nascent entrepreneurs. One important source of spillovers documented by regional economists is 
the research carried out by universities. To control for this possibility, we constructed the sum of 
university R&D spending, which is the total sum of R&D spending by local universities, obtained 
from the National Science Foundation (NSF). To normalize this variable and allow across-states 
comparisons, we divided it by the national annual mean. Hence, a value of one indicates that the 
R&D spending of a given state equals the national average in a given year. Moreover, when start-
ups enter a region by forming alliances directly with incumbents, they may directly access the 
relevant knowledge rather than indirectly benefit from knowledge spillovers. To control for such 
an effect, we constructed a variable, ties involving new firms, which counts the number of 
alliances held by new firms in the focal state at the time of their entry. 
Lastly, the regional economics literature has long recognized the availability of resources 
as a key driver of new entries in a region (Acs et al., 2009; Audretsch & Lehmann, 2005; 
Feldman, 2001). A region with more cross-cutting ties may abound with resources and 
opportunities, both of which underlie new entries. To further control for this alternative 
explanation, we included the following two variables: the number of science and engineering 
department (S & E depart.) graduates in a given state – a proxy for the supply of quality labor – 
and venture capital per density, i.e., the amount of equity investments made by venture capitalists 
in the focal state. The latter was based on data from the Thompson Financial, whereas the data 
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concerning the former were obtained from the IPEDS report of the National Center for Education 
Statistics. As in the case of university R&D spending, we normalized the values concerning the 
number of S&E department graduates. As for the venture capital per density variable, to 
underscore the relative magnitude of investments to incumbent organizations, we divided the 
amount of venture capitalists’ investments in the focal state by the number of ventures that 
received investments from venture capitalists. 
Model Specification 
We assumed that the number of de novo entries in each state followed a Poisson 
distribution. Yet, this assumption may not hold true when overdispersion is present. Although 
parameter estimates remain unbiased in the presence of overdispersion, they are inefficient and 
their standard errors are biased downward (Long, 1997). Wald test for overdispersion failed to 
reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 significance level.
3
 This result suggested that a Poisson 
model might be appropriate for our data. Accordingly, the expected number of new firms in state 
i in year t, it , is specified in the following way: 
])()(exp[ 254
2
3210 itititittit eODBTODBTODODBT    
where t is year fixed effects, CT is the number of cross-cutting ties, OD is organizational 
density, it is the set of control variables, and the unit of analysis of the present study is each 
state in the U.S. biotechnology industry. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
It is possible that unobserved heterogeneity at the state level may arise from unspecified 
attributes of each state. To cope with this concern, we employed an unconditional fixed effects 
                                                   
3
 The likelihood ratio test also failed to reject the null hypothesis at 0.01 significance level. 
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model when estimating the effects of the covariates on the dependent variable. Moreover, we 
included year dummies to control for unspecified temporal variations that were constant during a 
given year. The maximum likelihood method was employed to estimate the parameters. SAS 
version 8 was used to fit the model to the data. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the 
covariates included in our models. 
RESULTS 
Figure 1 shows the age distribution of cross-cutting ties, the key variable of interest in this 
study. The age of a cross-cutting tie is defined as that of the younger firm involved in the alliance. 
The age of zero indicates that a new firm participated in the alliance as a partner. Ties involving 
new firms, one of our control variables, refers to the number of ties with zero age. For 17 cases 
out of 621 cross-cutting ties, the age of a tie turned out to be zero. This indicates that cross-
cutting ties involving new firms are rather infrequent. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Table 2 shows the estimates of the number of new firms in the U.S. biotechnology 
industry from 1994 to 1998. Due to missing values, the state of Hawaii was excluded, which 
resulted in the inclusion of a total of 49 states. Model 1 includes only control variables and serves 
as a benchmark for the three different models that are derived from our theory. As for the control 
variables, Model 1 shows that the R&D spending of local universities is positively related to the 
number of new firms. The estimates for organizational density reveal the inverted U-shaped 
pattern, widely demonstrated in the literature: while the initial growth in density stimulates new 
entries, further increases tend to suppress them because of heightened competition.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
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In Model 2, we examine whether cooperative relations exhibit any effect on the formation 
of new firms. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the estimates of cross-cutting ties in Model 2 show a 
positive and statistically significant direct effect, even when we control for organizational density 
and the carrying capacity of the environment. The effect of cross-cutting ties, CT, exhibits the 
following form: CTODCTODCT *011.0*148.0476.0 2 . The first order derivative of this 
equation with respect to the cross-cutting ties variable is 
)(')](exp[ xgxg
x
Y



 where x is the 
number of cross-cutting ties and )(' xg  = 2*011.0*148.0476.0 ODOD . For instance, at the 
mean value of organizational density (i.e., OD = 4.49), the first order effect of cross-cutting ties 
equals 1.024 in Massachusetts in 1998 when other covariates are set to their sample mean.
4
 This 
result indicates that cross-cutting ties contribute to expanding business opportunities available to 
nascent entrepreneurs, ultimately increasing the number of new firms in a given state. To 
examine whether these effects are robust to alternative functional forms, we re-run a model 
employing the logged number of cross-cutting ties. The results obtained are consistent with those 
reported in Model 2. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the interaction of cross-cutting ties and the first-order effect 
of density is negative, whereas that of cross-cutting ties and the squared term of density is 
positive. This pattern suggests that the density dependent processes of legitimation and 
competition are negatively moderated by the number of cross-cutting ties in a given state. To 
illustrate this result, we plot the interaction in Figure 2. This figure benchmarks the curvilinear 
effect of density in the absence of cross-cutting ties with the effect in presence of cross-cutting 
ties at their sample mean. While the effect of density-dependent legitimation and competition 
                                                   
4
 For the full range of the OD variable, the main effects (see Aiken & West, 1991) of cross-cutting ties are 
positive. 
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appears evident in the absence of cross-cutting ties, the increase in cooperative relations among 
incumbent firms belonging to different states negatively moderates both these processes.  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Robustness Checks 
We undertook several additional analyses to prove the robustness of our results to 
measurement issues and to alternative methods of estimation.
5
  
Endogeneity & resource availability. We address the potential endogeneity of cross-
cutting ties in Model 4 of Table 2. As a region with abundant resources is more likely to exhibit 
cross-cutting ties and new firms are more likely to enter into it, our estimates of cross-cutting ties 
may be confounded with the effects of resource availability in the focal region. While our control 
variables may minimize this potential endogeneity in the estimation, we further control for this 
possibility by employing an instrumental variable (IV) estimation of our count model, as 
suggested by Mullahy (1997). Cross-cutting ties are instrumented by the number of inhabitants in 
a state and venture capital per density. The partial F test statistic against Model 1 is 7.1 with a p-
value of 0.06, showing that IV estimates do not provide a better fit to the data compared with 
Model 2. Moreover, the results of Model 4 are consistent with those reported in Model 2. This 
suggests that the estimates for cross-cutting ties in Model 2 are unlikely to be spurious. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Between-state variation in carrying capacity. Our fixed effects ML estimates examine the 
effects of cross-cutting ties in a given state on the number of new entries in that region. 
                                                   
5
 As it is likely that knowledge takes time to spill over to nascent entrepreneurs, we also explored the 
lagged effects of cross-cutting ties by re-estimating Model 2 with one-year lagged covariates. As Model 3 
shows, the results remain similar to those of Model 2. It suggests that the contemporaneous effect of cross-
cutting ties is weaker than that of its lagged counterpart.  
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Accordingly, differences across regions should not influence our estimation, which utilizes 
within-state variation only. Note also that for the sake of comparability with extant ecological 
research, we measured density as the sheer number of firms operating in a given state. 
Nonetheless, the estimates of organizational density may be contingent upon the carrying 
capacity of the focal state. Although several controls were included in our models
6
, we undertook 
additional analyses in which we divided the measure of organizational density by the number of 
inhabitants in the focal state, a proxy for the size of demand and labor supply. Model 1 of Table 3 
reports results consistent with those discussed so far. 
Knowledge spillovers. Our main analysis did not take the content of R&D agreements into 
account. Nonetheless, the specific contents of R&D agreements may lead to variations in the 
effects of cross-cutting ties. To uncover this, we classified R&D agreements into two categories: 
with and without technological licensing agreements. We expect that the size of knowledge 
spillovers is larger for the alliances with technological licensing because licensing involves 
codification and codified knowledge is more prone to spill over. The results reported in Models 2 
and 3 of Table 3 confirm this expectation. Those with licensing agreements exhibit significant 
positive effects on new entries in a given state ( 1 = 0.840 in Model 2), whereas those without 
licensing agreements do not display significant effects.  
While knowledge spillovers are found to be present at the state level (Anselin, Varga, & 
Acs, 1997; Jaffe et al., 1993), not all the actors in a given state are the equal beneficiaries of 
knowledge spillovers. To examine this possibility, we conducted a further analysis at the MSA 
(metropolitan statistical area) level by assuming that the actors located in a MSA with active 
biotech activities are more likely to benefit from spillovers. We selected 46 MSAs whose drug-
                                                   
6
 The number of within state ties may also reflect resource abundance in a region. Even when this measure 
is included, the results obtained remain similar to those reported in Model 2 of Table 2. 
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related patents were above the national annual average. Then, we pooled multiple MSAs in the 
same state into one cluster if they were closely connected via multiple within-state R&D 
agreements. In doing so, we used within-state ties to judge the degree of cohesion at the state 
level. As a result, we obtained 20 MSAs and 7 combined MSAs or clusters.
7
 Model 4 of Table 4 
reports the estimates obtained from the MSA-level models. The patterns appear largely consistent 
yet we obtain statistically significant results only when employing technology licensing 
agreements as cross-cutting ties, and not logging the organizational density variable. We interpret 
this finding as suggesting that the detection of the effects of cross-cutting ties remains contingent 
on the proper specification of the effects of density-dependence.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
Our hypotheses presume that by transferring new knowledge across states, cross-cutting 
ties may increase the knowledge diversity of a given state. To explore this assumption, we 
employed patent-citation data from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and constructed the 
following two diversity measures: knowledge diversity and complementarity-adjusted knowledge 
diversity. First, knowledge diversity (KD) is defined as:  










Mk
jt
kjt
jt
p
p
KD
2
1 where M is the 
set of SIC-corresponding patent classes, and kjtp and jtp are the number of patents in SIC-
corresponding class k in state j and the total number of patents in state j, respectively, in year t. 
Knowledge diversity is assumed to be low when the majority of patents are granted in a certain 
SIC-corresponding patent class. Second, complementarity-adjusted knowledge diversity (KDC) is 
                                                   
7
  They include California (i.e., San Francisco, Oakland, San Jose, Los Angeles, Orange County, and San 
Diego), Texas (i.e., Austin, Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio), Ohio (i.e., Cincinnati, Cleveland, and 
Columbus), New Jersey (i.e., Bergen, Middlesex, Newark, and Trenton), Connecticut (i.e., Harford, New 
Haven, and New London), New York (i.e., Albany, Nassau, New York, and Rochester), and Pennsylvania 
(i.e., Philadelphia and Pittsburgh). 
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defined as: kjtkMkjtjt qwKDKDC  where M is the set of SIC-corresponding patent classes, 
kw is a share of the contribution made by SIC-corresponding class k to patents in the field of 
biotechnology industry, and kjq is the proportion of patents from SIC-corresponding class k in 
state j in year t. This measure reflects the extent to which the knowledge available in a specific 
state is diverse and at the same time complementary. Knowledge in a region is complementary as 
it is easily synthesized for the development of new inventions. A higher value of this measure 
indicates that knowledge available in a state is not only diverse but also complementary, i.e., easy 
to recombine and thus likely to result in new inventions.  
Because the measure of knowledge diversity ranges between 0 and 1, we employed a 
double censored Tobit model to investigate the relationship between knowledge diversity and 
cross-cutting ties. Knowledge diversity is the byproduct of the knowledge creation efforts in a 
focal state. Therefore, in the models reported in Table 4, we included the following covariates 
that may proxy knowledge creation efforts: the sum of university R&D spending, venture capital 
per density, the number of S&E graduates, and organizational density (e.g., Cohen & Klepper, 
1992). While the fit of the model to the data is higher in Model 2 than in Model 1, the estimates 
of cross-cutting ties appear robust across the two models. The positive and statistically significant 
coefficient estimates of the cross-cutting ties variable are consistent with our assumption: the 
more cross-cutting ties that are present in the focal state, the more diverse is the knowledge 
available in that state. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
The present study examines the role of interfirm relations among incumbents in new firm 
formation. More specifically, we focus on alliance agreements among firms in the same industry, 
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yet located in different institutional and geographical contexts. We view such cooperation as a 
key conduit for new knowledge transfer and a facilitator of new entries. Our model draws on the 
literature on knowledge spillovers (Acs et al., 2009; Audretsch, 1995; Audretsch & Lehmann, 
2005) and contend that cross-cutting ties stimulate new firm formation by expanding the 
knowledge available to potential entrepreneurs. We tested our model by using the data on the US 
biotech industry from 1994 to 1998. The results obtained – which proved to be robust across a 
wide variety of specifications – suggest that (i) cross-cutting ties are positively related to the 
number of new firms observed in a given state and (ii) negatively moderate density-dependent 
processes of legitimation and competition.  
From a theoretical standpoint, this paper shows that the effects of interfirm relations are 
not limited to the firms embedded in those relations, but extend to third parties as well. Despite 
many empirical studies on the embeddedness hypothesis, an analysis of the industry-level 
outcomes, not the organizational-level ones, is rare except for small-world network studies (e.g., 
Baum, Shipilov, & Rowley, 2003; Powell et al., 2005). In particular, the current literature mainly 
focuses on the effects of social relations on the parties directly embedded in them, but remains 
largely ignorant of their unintended consequences for those that do not enter such relations. This 
study draws the attention to nascent entrepreneurs as third parties not embedded into such 
relations. As the liability of newness suggests, nascent entrepreneurs hardly prevail over 
incumbents when incumbents pre-empt key resources. However, this study shows that unlike 
resources, knowledge cannot be fully pre-empted and that knowledge spillovers may enable 
nascent entrepreneurs to discover and pursue new business opportunities.  
Moreover, the present paper views formal interfirm relations as a key trigger for regional 
knowledge spillovers. The entrepreneurship literature emphasizes the role of individual and 
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institutional ties as channels of knowledge spillovers, which fuel entrepreneurial activities. Most 
studies focus on linking non-commercial institutional ties, such as university-to-scientist ties, to 
entrepreneurial activities. Inspired by the work of Mansfield (1983), the present study however 
suggests that commercial ties, such as R&D agreements among profit-seeking firms, may also 
serve as a channel for knowledge spillovers. Obviously, formal agreements per se do not 
necessarily engender regional knowledge spillovers. Rather, the direct consequence of formal 
R&D agreements is the transfer of new knowledge. However, such knowledge has the potential 
to spill over to the third parties – both nascent entrepreneurs and other incumbents that are co-
located with the firms entering such agreements. That is because co-location facilitates frequent 
face-to-face interactions or individual ties, the crucial vehicles for knowledge spillovers.   
This paper also contributes to clarifying a possible boundary condition of density 
dependence (for a review see Carroll & Hannan, 2000). In particular, our results indicate that the 
evolution of organizational populations is influenced not only by organizational density but also 
by the intensity of cross-cutting ties in an industry. Without the careful examination of 
cooperative interfirm relations, density-dependent process would provide only a partial view of 
industry evolution. While it is now clear that organizational diversity reduces competition (e.g., 
Baum & Mezias, 1992), the literature has only recently started to explore the role of 
organizational diversity in the emergence of a new business (e.g., McKendrick et al., 2003; 
Boone et al., 2007). The present paper provides a fresh perspective on this issue. Similarly to the 
legitimacy discounts encountered by the organizations involved in different businesses 
(McKendrick et al., 2003), our model suggests that horizontal relations among incumbent firms 
from different institutional contexts may hamper the legitimation process. To the extent that 
legitimation is a matter of cognitive categorization (Hannan et al., 2007), our findings suggest 
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that knowledge diversity fostered by cross-cutting ties may inhibit the development of a crisp 
consensus concerning the defining properties of a new business.  
Moreover, our analysis of cross-cutting ties has implications for the study of exploration 
and exploitation alliances (e.g., Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 
2006; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). This line of research focuses on the conditions under which 
exploration alliances are preferred to exploitation ones, and on their associated performance gains. 
Cross-cutting ties may be conceived of as an instance of exploration alliances because they allow 
firms to access new knowledge. If so, our analysis implies that incumbents would risk facing 
more competition when actively engaging in exploration alliances. The reason is that the 
knowledge diversity induced by cross-cutting ties provides new business opportunities to 
potential entrants as well as to incumbents. Hence, cross-cutting ties that are supposed to 
primarily help incumbents may trigger new entrants as well. The mechanism underlying this 
effect lies in the knowledge spillovers created by cross-cutting ties. Our narrative appears aligned 
with that of Teece (1986) who suggested that the returns to the creation of new knowledge are not 
necessarily appropriated by its direct contributor. In this regard, it would be interesting to 
examine the competitive effects of cross-cutting ties on the performance of the incumbent firms 
embedded in such relations. For example, when incumbents suffer from structural inertia and 
core rigidities (Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Leonard-Barton, 1992), knowledge spillovers should 
help nascent entrepreneurs to compete with them more effectively.   
On a managerial standpoint, our study implies that when locating operations, nascent 
entrepreneurs should take the potential for knowledge spillovers into account. Typically, entry 
decisions are based on the evaluation of industry attractiveness, such as competitive intensity and 
the availability of reliable suppliers. The positive direct effect of cross-cutting ties suggests that a 
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region with active knowledge creation may offer rich business opportunities to nascent 
entrepreneurs. The number of cross-cutting ties as well as the R&D spending of nearby research 
institutions is a good indicator of knowledge creation and, eventually, of business opportunities. 
Our results also suggest that new entrepreneurs should consider entering cross-cutting ties when 
density is low because the positive direct effect of cross-cutting ties outweighs the negative 
effects of the interaction between cross-cutting ties and organizational density. Conversely, cross-
cutting ties are more favourable to incumbents when accompanied by density increases.
8
 For 
policy makers, our results indicate that in a region marked by a large number of firms (i.e., when 
density dependent competition is at work), governmental agencies may consider supporting inter-
firm cooperative agreements that bridge distant sources of knowledge as they may serve to 
weaken the negative effects of organizational density on new entries.
9
 
Despite these implications, our study presents several limitations as well. First, our 
findings may be industry-specific. When firms in an industry opt for mature technologies and do 
not differ from one another, the quest for alliances may decrease and the effects of cross-cutting 
ties may not be substantial. Second, informal social relations that span distant sources could also 
be a conduit of knowledge spillovers and thus a potential alternative to cross-cutting ties. The 
literature, as well as qualitative evidence on the biotech industry, suggests that entrepreneurial 
activities are often regionally bounded and the development of the biotech industry appears 
uneven in the US. This leads us to assume that cross-cutting ties provide access to diverse 
knowledge. Yet, informal social relations may offer alternative access to proprietary knowledge 
too. For example, spillovers may exist when scientists interact on various commercial projects 
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 When we log-transform the model to make our interpretation simpler, the marginal effect of cross-
cutting ties (i.e., CT) contingent upon the level of organizational density (i.e., OD) is following: 
2011.0148.0476.0/log ODODCT    
9
 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for his/ her valuable suggestions on this matter. 
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across different geographical areas. Indeed, in our study, the effects of formal R&D agreements 
could materialize through informal relations. A direct comparison of such formal and informal 
channels of knowledge spillovers needs to be undertaken to test the robustness of our findings.   
 30 
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FIGURE 1. The Age-Frequency Distribution of Cross-Cutting Ties 
 
FIGURE 2. The Density Dependent Process Conditional upon Cross-Cutting Ties 
1) 
 
1) The following equation is used to examine the interaction effects: Y = exp(-8.196+3.894*OD – 
0.355*OD
2
 –0.148*OD*CT +0.011*OD2*CT), where OD refers to organizational density and CT 
refers to cross-cutting ties. 
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TABLE 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations 
a 
 Mean S. D. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. New firm formation  4.361  8.505 0.614 0.817 0.134 0.599 0.164 0.709 0.536 
2. Organizational density, logged 4.490 1.152  0.614 0.449 0.406 0.302 0.764 0.474 
3. Cross-cutting ties 5.607 13.23   0.110 0.653 0.166 0.652 0.449 
4. Network constraint 0.319 0.352    0.061 0.145 0.269 0.127 
5. Tie involving new firms 0.102 0.398     0.085 0.388 0.283 
6. Venture capital per density 3.002 3.592      0.259 0.228 
7. Number of S&E Depart. 
graduates 
1.000 0.981       0.472 
8. Sum of university R&D 
spending 
2.807 6.459        
 
N = 244. All are significant at 0.05 significance level except the correlations of Tie involving new 
firms with Network constraint and Venture capital per density.  
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TABLE 2 
The Unconditional Fixed Effects Poisson Model For Entries into the Industry 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant -6.466  -8.196  -26.74 
**
 -9.753 
*
 
 (3.663) (4.851) (6.732) (4.465) 
Venture capital per density -0.003 -0.006 -0.015 -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.035) (0.012) 
Number of S & E depart. graduates -1.663 
*
  -0.849  2.119  -1.150 
 (0.655) (0.781) (1.126) (0.739) 
Sum of university R&D spending 0.016 
**
 0.004 0.657 0.009 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.909) (0.007) 
Organizational density, logged [OD] 3.608 
**
  3.894 
*
  9.073 
**
 3.682 
*
 
 (1.199) (1.683) (2.369) (1.637) 
OD
2
 -0.331 
**
 -0.355 
*
 -0.848 
**
 -0.312  
 (0.109) (0.166) (0.231) (0.172) 
Ties involving new firms -0.146 
*
 -0.175 
*
 0.176 
*
 -0.164 
**
 
 (0.072) (0.079) (0.088) (0.074) 
Network constraint 0.264  0.143  -0.334   0.185   
 (0.172) (0.179) (0.222) (0.177) 
Cross-cutting ties [CT]  0.476 
*
  1.502 
**
  0.888 
*
  
  (0.244) (0.385) (0.408) 
OD ⅹ Cross-cutting ties  -0.148 *   -0.448 **   -0.199 *   
  (0.071) (0.116) (0.096) 
OD
2
 ⅹ Cross-cutting ties   0.011 *    0.033 **    0.014 *    
  (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) 
Year 1995 -0.258 
*
  -0.290 
*
   -0.285 
*
  
 (0.121) (0.130)  (0.122) 
Year 1996 0.141  0.108  0.439 
**
  0.105  
 (0.177) (0.178) (0.136) (0.179) 
Year 1997 0.304  0.265  0. 468 
*
 0.252 
 (0.209) (0.211) (0.222) (0.213) 
Year 1998 0.161  0.307  0.512   0.209  
 (0.319) (0.329) (0.281) (0.327) 
Region specific effects Included Included Included Included 
     
Number of observations 244 244 194 244 
2  (d.f) vs. Model 1  8.7 (3) * 18.6 (3) ** 7.1 (3)  
*
 p<.05; 
**
 p<0.01 (two tailed tests); Standard errors are in parentheses. ML estimates are reported. All 
covariates are one-year lagged in Model 3. New firms at year T refer to de novo entries that did not exist 
prior to T. In Model 4, cross-cutting ties are instrumented by the number of inhabitants and venture capital 
per density.  
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TABLE 3 
Alliance Type, Carrying Capacity and New Firm Formation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant -1.338  -8.631   -11.323 
*
  0.226  
 (3.432) (4.680) (4.765) (7.883) 
Venture capital per density -0.003 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) 
Number of S & E depart. graduates -1.537 
*
 -0.866  -0.161  -0.206 
 (0.740) (0.755) (0.842) (0.333) 
Sum of university R&D spending -0.002 0.006 0.007 0.114 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.346) 
Organizational density, logged [OD] 2.432  3.983 
*
  4.836 
**
  6.978   
 (1.727) (1.611) (1.617) (3.653) 
OD
2
 -0.302 -0.360 
*
 -0.443 
**
 -7.120 
*
 
 (0.253) (0.156) (0.160) (2.806) 
Ties involving new firms -0.129   -0.152 
*
  -0.209 
*
  -0.335 
*
  
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.092) (0.156) 
Network constraint 0.281  0.132  0.194  -0.024  
 (0.171) (0.178) (0.176) (0.221) 
Cross-cutting ties  0.412 
*
  0.840 
**
  -0.137  0.086 
*
  
 (0.183) (0.292) (0.615) (0.036) 
OD ⅹ Cross-cutting ties -0.228 *   -0.247 **   -0.028   -0.224 **   
 (0.094) (0.086) (0.181) (0.083) 
OD
2
 ⅹ Cross-cutting ties  0.031 *    0.018 **    0.007    0.156 **    
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.013) (0.058) 
     
Year dummies  Included Included Included Included 
Region specific effects Included Included Included  Included 
     
Number of observations 244 244 244  135 
2  (d.f) vs. Intercept-only model 1794 (62) 1807 (62) 1809 (62) 508 (40) 
*
 p<.05; 
**
 p<0.01; Standard errors are in parentheses. ML estimates are reported. For Model 1, 
organizational density is divided by the number of inhabitants. For Models 2 and 3, cross-cutting ties are 
based on alliances that involve technology licensing agreements (427 cases) and those without licensing 
agreements (194 cases), respectively. The unit of analysis for Model 4 is the metropolitan area and cross-
cutting ties in this model are based on alliances that involve technology licensing agreements. Note that 
organizational density is not log-transformed in Model 4. 
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TABLE 4 
The Effects of Cross-Cutting Ties on Knowledge Diversity 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Knowledge 
Diversity 
Complementary-adjusted 
Knowledge Diversity 
   
Constant 0.779 
**
 0.429 
 (0.024) (1.144) 
Venture capital per density (
110 ) 0.003 0.509  
 (0.006) (0.262) 
Sum of university R&D spending (
110 ) -0.004 0.207 
 (0.005) (0.216) 
Number of S & E depart. Graduates (
110 ) 0.094 **  -3.753 *  
 (0.036) (1.703) 
Organizational density, logged (OD) 0.063 
**
  1.376 
*
  
 (0.012) (0.549) 
OD
2
 -0.008 
**
  -0.164 
*
  
 (0.002) (0.070) 
Cross-cutting ties, logged (
110 ) 0.064 *  0.917 **  
 (0.029) (0.139) 
Year 1995 -0.002 0.200 
 (0.006) (0.282) 
Year 1996 -0.003 0.058 
 (0.006) (0.282) 
Year 1997 -0.006  0.659 
*
 
 (0.006) (0.283) 
Year 1998 -0.015   0.270  
 (0.007) (0.342) 
   
 of the latent dependent variable 0.029 **  1.378 **   
 (0.001) (0.062) 
Number of observations 244 244 
2  (d.f) vs. Intercept-only model 43.55 (10) 87.93 (10) 
*
 p<.05; 
**
 p<0.01 (two tailed tests); Standard errors are in parentheses. The ML estimates of the double 
censored Tobit model are reported.  
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